Small is beautiful : preferential trade agreements and the impact of country size, market share, efficiency, and trade policy by Schiff, Maurice
_  _\?S  I  6
POLICY RESEARCH WXORKING  PAPER  I 668
Small Is Beautiful  v-a
SIc't)  I  .! t, !  s  itroro  ;'ci
U  in  p0:rz;  jel  fr.  thle  ihiv  4 t' Ul
Preferential  Trade Agreements  ,,ct  ,f,erenlia  rt,
and the Impact  of Country  Size,  . 'i hon
Market  Share, Efficiency,  I  the  npocash
and Trade Policy  m-  e  thc  )s  r  tprtS1
rew :rmk  f'  J:  the hlon&
Maurice Schiff  nti  . vS.tnr ot, a  rr -I
Bf  /  s  r  t  1!,irc,--  irla;finc  l-
a;,  c  I<r,  b  '-mber  of  ri  sn-
The World Bank


















































































































dPOLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPFR  1668
Summary  findings
There has been a resurgence of preferential trade  This result has important implications for choice of
agreements (PTAs) partly because of the deeper  partners.
European integration known as EC-92, which led to a  * A small home country loses from forming a free
fear of a Fortress Eiurope; and partlY because of the U.S.  trade agreement (FTA) with a small partner country but
decision to form a PT'A  with (Canada.  As a resilt, there  gains from forming one with the rest of the world. In
has been a domino effect: a proliferation of PTAs, which  other words, the home couintry is better off as a small
has led to renewed debate about how P1As affect both  member of a large bloc than as a large member of a small
welfare and the multilateral system.  bloc. Ibhis  result need not hold if smuggling is a factor.
Schiff examines two issues: the welfare impact of  *  Home country welfare after formation of a FTA is
preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and the effect of  higher when imports from rhe partner  country are
structural and policv clianges on PTAs. He asks how the  smaller,  whether  the partner country is large or small.
PTA's effect on honie-country w  elfare is affected by  Welfare worsens as imports from the partner country
higher dermand for imports; the efficiency of production  increase.
of the partner  or rest of the world (ROW); the share  *  In general, a PTA is more beneficial (or less harmful)
imported from the partner  (ROW); and the initial  for a country with lower import demand. A PTA is also
protection on imiports from the partner  (ROW).  more beneficial for a country with a more efficient
Among his findings:  import-substittiting sector, as this will result in a lower
An individual country benefits more from a PTA if it  demand for imports.
Imports less from its partner  countries (with imports  A small countrv may gain from forming a PTA when
measured either in VolUme'  or as a share of total imports).  smugglinig  is a factor.
Thispaper-aproduct  of the International Trade Division, International Economics Department-ispartofa  largereffort
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1818 H Street NW, Washingtoni,  DC 20433.  Please  contact Minerva Patefia, room N5-048, telephone 202-473-9515, fax
202-522-1159,  Interniet  adkdress  mpattna(a.iworldbank.org. Octobter 1  996. (.36  pages)
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papers carry  the nanies  ofthe  authors  and shouldI  h  used  and cited accordingly.  The  findings,  interpretations,  and conclusions  are the
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I. Introduction
The welfare impact of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) is an issue which has been the
subject of an ongoing debate.  Early contributions are Viner (1950), Meade (1955) and Lipsey
(1960).  Much of the early work was stimulated by the integration experiments taking place in
Europe  (e.g.,  Meade 1956).  The  1990s have seen a resurgence  of North-South PTAs  in the
Americas and between the EU and Mediterranean and Eastern European countries, and of South-
South PTAs such as MERCOSUR  in South America,  the ASEAN Free  Trade Agreement or
AFTA in South-East Asia, and the Cross-Border Initiative in sub-Saharan Africa.'
The resurgence of PTAs is due in part to the deeper European integration known as EC-92
which led to a fear of a "Fortress Europe",  and in part to the U.S. decision to form a PTA with
Canada.  This  has resulted in a domino effect,  with a proliferation of PTAs (Baldwin, 1995).
These events have led to renewed debate on the impact of PTAs on welfare, as well as on the
impact of PTAs on the multilateral system (Winters 1996).
The literature on the welfare effect of PTAs has distinguished between the effect on the
PTAs'  member countries and the effect on the rest of the world (ROW).  This paper focuses on
the member countries.
PTAs affect both the exports and the imports of member countries.  The following claims,
'Recent experience and future prospects involving the EU are examined in Winters (1993).
3related to the impact on home country welfare of changes on the export side, are not subject to
debate: i) improved access for home country exports to the partner's  market raises the welfare
gain (or reduces the welfare loss) of a PTA; ii) the benefit of improved market access is larger
the larger the home country's post-integration exports to the partner country; and iii) the benefit
of improved market access is larger the larger the partner's  reduction in trade barriers.
On  the  other  hand,  the  welfare  impact on  the  home country  of  changes in  imports
associated with the formation of PTAs is still subject to debate.  Consequently, the focus of the
analysis in this paper is on the import side.  A PTA results in trade creation and trade diversion.
The former raises welfare, while the latter has both a welfare-reducing and a welfare-increasing
effect (with a presumption that the net effect of trade diversion is negative).  Thus, the welfare
impact of a PTA is ambiguous a priori.  Moreover, it is perfectly likely that while PTA members
as a whole may be better off, individual members may still lose - for example because of possible
losses in tariff revenues (which are captured either partly or fully by the other members as an
improvement in their terms of trade).
Not only has the welfare impact of PTAs on member countries been a matter of debate,
but the effect of changes in structural and policy variables on the welfare impact of PTAs has been
subject to debate as well.  Some of the questions examined below,  and which have not been
conclusively answered in the literature, are:
How is the impact of a PTA on home country welfare affected by a higher
a) demand for imports?
b) efficiency of production of the partner (ROW)?
c) share imported from the partner (ROW)?
4d) initial protection on imports from the partner (ROW)?
A.  'Natural'  Trading Partners
A number of studies argue that if two countries or regions are 'natural'  trading partners,
they are more likely to gain from a PTA between them.  First,  Summers (1991) states that "...
to the extent that blocs are created between countries that already trade disproportionately, the risk
of large amounts of trade diversion is reduced".  Second, in a 1995 communication from the EU
Commission to the Council entitled "Free Trade Areas: An Appraisal" (henceforth referred to as
the "EU Report"),  it is stated that PTAs formed with natural trading partners are less likely to
have detrimental trade diversion effects.  Third, Lipsey (1960) states that "...  given a country's
volume of international trade, a customs union is more likely to raise welfare the higher is the
proportion of trade with the country's union partner and the lower the proportion with the outside
world. "2
Fourth, Park (1995) states that "The smaller the intra-regional shares in total trade ... the
more likely the trading blocs would become trade diverting. "  Fifth, Wonnacott and Lutz (1989)
argue that, ceteris paribus, since proximity between PTA members increases trade among them,
21t should be noted that,  from the example used in his paper, what Lipsey seems to have in
mind - when talking about the proportion of goods traded - is the proportion of different products
traded.  Lipsey argues (p. 507) that when a customs union is formed, the relative price between
imports from the partner  and domestic goods is brought  into conformity with the real rates of
transformation, while the relative price between imports from the partner and from the outside
world  is moved away from equality with real rates of transformation.  Hence, the larger are
purchases  of domestic commodities and the smaller are purchases from the outside world, the
more likely it is that the union will raise welfare.  Lipsey concludes that the size of imports from
the partner is unimportant.
5it reduces the extent of trade diversion and increases the benefits of PTAs, a point also made by
Deardorff and Stern (1994).  And sixth, drawing on Jaquemin and Sapir (1991) and on Wonnacott
and Lutz (1989), Langhammer (1992) also reaches the same conclusion.
The studies mentioned above examine welfare from the viewpoint of the regional bloc as
a whole.  In Section II, several counter-examples are used to show that their result does not hold
in general.  Second, it is shown - in Section II for the small-country case and in Section III for the
large-country case - that the opposite holds from the viewpoint of an individual member country.
In other words, an individual country benefits more from a PTA if it imports less from its partner
countries (with imports measured either in volume or as a share of total imports).  This result has
important implications for individual countries'  choice of partner countries when contemplating
forming a PTA or joining an existing one.
B. Other Issues
A second claim which has been made is that, other things equal,  it is better for a small
home country to form a PTA with a large country rather than with a smaller one.  For instance,
it has been argued that Chile would do better  by forming a PTA  with a large region such as
NAFTA  than with a (smaller) South American country.  And Morocco  would be better off by
forming a PTA with the EU than with Algeria or Tunisia.  This issue is examined in Section II.
A third claim is that the higher the post-union tariff on the ROW, the higher the potential
for trade diversion and the lower the benefit of the PTA.  For instance, Leipziger and Winters
(1995) and Schiff (1995) argue that a FTA between Chile and NAFTA will generate larger gains
(or smaller losses) for Chile if it lowers its uniform tariff rate from its present level of 11 percent.
6This issue is also examined  in Sections  11  and III.
A fourth claim is that, other things  equal, it is better  for the home  country to form a PTA
with a region which is more rather than less  efficient. The presumption  is that the more efficient
the partner in the PTA, the larger the potential  for trade creation  and the smaller  the potential  for
trade diversion. This question  is addressed in Section  III.
Section  II, which  draws on Panagariya  (1995a, 1995b),  examines  the welfare impact  of a
PTA between  small  countries,  between  a small and a large country, and how the welfare impact
of a PTA is affected  by changes in the level of imports. Section  III expands and generalizes  on
previous  work by examining  the case of large countries. It provides  an algebraic  solution  for the
case  where the slope of the supply  functions  (of exports from the partner country and the ROW
to the home  country)  and the initial home  country  tariffs on the partner country  and on the ROW
can take any non-negative  value. 3 Section  II. 1 presents  the model  and the solution  for the welfare
impact  of a PTA on member  countries. The effect  on the welfare impact  of a PTA of changes in
various  structural  parameters  and policy  variables  is derived in Section  III.2. Section  IV examines
how the welfare  impact  of a PTA between  small countries  is affected  by smuggling  and by rules
of origin.  Section  V concludes.
3Cawley  and Davenport  (1988) examine  the impact  of removing  internal barriers in the EU
in a partial equilibrium  framework. Their analysis  differs in two important  ways from the one
presented  here. First, the internal  barriers they examine  are sources  of real resource costs rather
than transfers as in the case of tariffs.  Second, they do not examine the effect of changes in
structural variables  on the impact  of PTAs.
7II. The Small-Country Case
The issue of the welfare impact of a PTA and how trade shares affect it was examined in
Panagariya (1995a) for the case where the partner country's  supply curve is upward sloping and
the ROW's supply is infinitely elastic.  Panagariya (1995b) also examines the opposite case where
the partner's  supply is infinitely elastic and the ROW's  supply curve is upward sloping, while
Bhagwati and Panagariya (1995, examine the cases where either one or both of the two sources
of imports has an infinitely elastic supply curve.
Assume three countries: the home country. the partner country and the rest of the world
(ROW).  Assume that markets are perfectly competitive, and that goods imported from the ROW,
from the partner country, and domestically produced import substitutes are homogeneous. 4 The
analysis is carried out in partial equilibrium.  This assumes that there are no distortions in the rest
of the economy or that the importable sector which is examined is small and has no impact on the
rest of the economy.
Assume the home country and the partner  country form a free trade agreement (FTA).
The home and partner countries are assumed to be small relative to the ROW.  This is especially
relevant for PTAs between developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Maghreb, South-East
Asia, the Middle East and Central America.  The home and partner countries take the price from
4The assumptions of perfect competition and homogeneity hold most closely for agricultural
and  mineral commodities.  However,  manufactured goods are generally heterogeneous,  and
imports from one region are often imperfectly substitutable with imports from other regions and
with domestically produced goods.  On the welfare effect of a PTA under heterogeneous goods
for a small open economy facing infinitely elastic import supplies from both the partner and the
ROW, see Rutherford, Rutstrom and Tarr (1994) who apply their analysis to the case of a PTA
between Morocco and the EU.
8the ROW, Pw, as given.  This is shown in Figure 1.
DH represents the home country's demand for imports, S. represents the partner's  supply
of exports  facing the home country, and SROW  is the supply from the ROW.  Under free trade.
imports equal Q4, and home country welfare WH =  triangle ACE.  Assume now that the home
country  imposes an MFN tariff T.  Then,  the price of imports from the ROW faced by home
country producers and consumers rises to Pw'  =  Pw +  T.  and SROI'  shifts to S'ROW.  Similarly.
S. shifts to S'..  Imports from the partner country equal Ql, imports from the ROW equal Q3  -
Ql, with total imports of Q3. WHMFN  =  surplus ABF +  tariff revenue BDEF, and is lower than
WH  under free trade by triangle BCD.
Assume the home country now forms a FTA with the partner country.  As the partner
country no longer pays the tariff T, its export supply curve shifts to Sp. The ROW still pays the
tariff T, so the home country price remains Pw..  Hence, partner country imports increase from
Q 1 to Q 2, while the imports  from the ROW fall from Q 3-Q 1 to Q 3-Q,. This results in a worsening
in the home country's  terms of trade.  Welfare is W%FTA  =  ABF + BDIG.  In other words, the
FTA has no impact on the consumer surplus because the price is not affected, but there is a loss
of tariff revenue. 5 WHFTA  is lower than WH\IFN  by EFGI, the tariff revenue lost on imports from
the partner country after forming the FTA.  Note that the welfare loss to the home country would
occur in the absence of trade diversion as well (e.g.,  the loss would be EFGI if Sp were vertical
at level Q 2).
The home country welfare  loss from  the FTA  is proportional  to the  level of partner
5In Section III where I examine the large-country case,  a FTA does affect the consumer
surplus.
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C4country imports.  Consequently, the loss from a FTA with a 'natural'  trading partner is larger if
imports  from the partner  are larger.  In Section 1II, I show that this result holds under more
general conditions where the slopes of both supply curves and both tariff levels (on imports from
the partner country and from the ROW) can take any positive value.  Note also that if the MFN
tariff were lower than T, the welfare loss from the FTA would be smaller than area EFGI both
because of lower imports from the partner and because of the lower tariff rate.  As is shown in
Seztion III, this result holds in the general case as well.
The partner gains EFGJ. which is less than the home country loss of EFGI by the triangle
GIJ.  The reason for the net loss of triangle GIJ for the FTA members as a whole is due to the
trade diversion of (Q, - Q,) which was previously imported from the ROW at a cost of Pw but
which is now produced at a higher marginal cost.
Section l.A on 'natural' trading partners listed several studies which argued that a regional
bloc would be better off if its members traded a larger share among themselves relative to their
total trade.  However, as shown in Figure  1, the welfare loss GIJ to the members of the FTA is
independent of the level of trade between the partners (QM)  or of the share of trade between the
partners relative to their total trade (Q2/Q3).  Rather, the loss GIJ depends on the the elasticity of
the partner's  supply curve (SP) and on the level of the tariff (T).  The more elastic pS and the
higher the tariff, the larger the loss.  Note that a higher initial tariff implies a larger share traded
with the partner (since Q 2 increases and Q 3 falls). 6 In this case, the loss to the FTA increases with
6This  result holds also if the share is the one before the formation of the FTA (Ql/Q3).  Since
the home country price rises by the full amount of the MFN tariff T, the (net-of-tariff) producer
price for exports by the partner country to the home country remains unchanged as the MFN tariff
rises.  Thus, the amount Q, imported from the partner does not change as the MFN tariff rises.
10the share traded with the partner country.
Moreover,  if Sp goes through point J in Figure  1 but is more elastic, then imports from
the partner (Q 2) as well as the share imported from the partner (Q2/Q3) are larger and the loss GIJ
is larger as well.  Both the higher initial MFN tariff and the more elastic supply of imports from
the partner country generates welfare effects for the FTA members which are opposite to those
mentioned in the studies cited in Section I.A.  Thus, we have shown that the argument made in
the literature does not hold in general.
Assume alternatively that the home country forms a FTA with the ROW.  Then, following
the formation  of the FTA, the relevant supply curves are SROW  and S'p (Figure  1).  The home
country now gains from forming a FTA, with the gains equal to triangle BCD + the tariff revenue
collected on the third country (equal to rectangle FRNE).'  Note also that as imports from the
partner (equal to NC) fall and those of the third country (equal to EN) increase,  the welfare gain
for the home country increases.
Thus, we have shown that a small home country loses from forming a FTA with a small
partner country but gains from forming one with the ROW.  In other words, the home country
is better off as a small  member of a large bloc than as a large member of a small bloc.8 We have
On the other hand,  total imports Q3 fall with the MFN tariff;  thus, Q  1 1Q3 rises with the MFN
tariff.
7The latter assumes that the third country, which now receives a net price of Pw - T, cannot
sell to the ROW at a higher price than Pw - T.  This assumption holds if the ROW had an import
tariff  larger or equal to T,  or if the home country and the ROW form a customs union with a
common external tariff equal to T.
8The case of a small country joining the entire ROW in a regional bloc, with a small third
country left out of the bloc, is probably rare.  For instance, Eastern European and Mediterranean
11also shown that home country welfare after formation of a FTA is higher when imports from the
partner country are smaller, and that this result holds irrespective of whether the partner country
is small (with an upward sloping supply curve Sp)  or whether it is large (with an horizontal supply
curve SROW)*  The welfare effect under the various alternatives is shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Effect of Forming  a FTA on Home Country  Welfare
Small Member of  Large Member of
a Large Bloc  a Small Bloc
Level of  HIGH  - Positive and  - Negative and
Imports  Small  Large
from
Partner  LOW  - Positive and  - Negative and
Country  Large  Small
As Table  1 shows, the best choice from the home country's  viewpoint is to be a small
member of a large bloc and a small importer from the bloc's partner country.  The worst outcome
is to be a large member of a small bloc and a large importer from the bloc's partner country.  As
is shown in Section IV, this result need not hold in the case of smuggling.
countries have signed agreements with the EU, but some outside countries - including the U.S.
and  Japan - are not small.  Assume then that the home country faces imports from two large
countries  with horizontal supply curves - say, ROW, and ROW 2 - as well as imports from one
small country with an upward-sloping supply curve.  Assume imports from ROW 1 are cheaper
than those from ROW 2. Then, the home country will not import from ROW  under the MFN
tariff, and our results hold as long the home country forms a FTA with ROW,.  The analysis is
based on the assumption that the FTA is with ROW,.  However, note that if the home country
forms a FTA with ROW 2, then whether it is better to form a FTA with ROW 2 or with the small
country is ambiguous a priori because the impact on the home country's welfare of forming a FTA
with ROW 2 is itself ambiguous (it depends on the cost difference on imports from ROW,
and ROW 2, on the level of the MFN tariff,  and on the level and elasticity of demand).
12In Section III below, I show - among others - that the result, that the impact of a PTA on
home country welfare worsens as imports from the partner country increase, holds in the large
country-case as well.
III. The Large-Country Case
1. The Model
Before the formation of the PTA, the home country levies a tariff T, on country  1 (the
partner country) and tariff T 2 on country 2 (the ROW).  It is typically assumed - as was done in
the previous  section - that T,  =  T 2 =  T,  the MFN  tariff,  before the formation  of the PTA.
However, the results derived below hold also in the more general case where T 1 differs from T2
before the formation of the PTA.  Hence, equality between T,  and T 2 is not imposed.
Welfare W is defined as the sum of consumer surplus and tariff revenue, or
P  (o)
W  =  f  D(u)du+  (TiS  +T2S2)
p
where Si =  imports from country i, D(P) is the demand for imports, P(O) is the demand price
when imports are equal to zero, and u is a variable of integration.  Then
dW =  - D(P).dP  +  [(T 1.dS,  + T2.dS 2)  +  (S1.dTI + S2.dT2)],
where  the first term is the change in consumer surplus and the second term (in square
13brackets) is the change in tariff revenue.  The relationship between the demand price P and the
supply or border price Pi is
(1) P =  Pi + Ti;  i  =  1, 2,
where Ti is the specific tariff on imports from country i.  Equilibrium is given by
(2) D(P)  =  SI +  S2  Q.
From equation (1), dP =  dP, +  dT,.  Using equation (2), dW can be rewritten as
dW  =  - (S1.dPI  +  S2.dP2) +  (TjdSI +  T2dS2).
The first term is the terms of trade effect.  An increase in the border price Pi by an amount
dP 1 results in a loss equal to S1.dPj.  The second term is the trade volume effect.  The difference
between the marginal value P (to the consumer) of an additional unit of imports from country i
and the cost Pi of the unit imported is Ti.  Any increase in imports S, by an amount dS 1 generates
a welfare gain equal to T1.dSi.
Thus, the change in welfare can be expressed either as the sum of the changes in consumer
surplus and tariff revenue,  or equivalently as the sum of the terms of trade effect and the trade
volume effect.  In the analysis below,  we examine welfare effects in terms of the effects on
consumer surplus and on tariff revenue.
14In order to keep the problem  tractable,  all functions  are assumed  to be linear. This  enables
us to derive first-order approximations  to the actual effects of various simulations  under more
general  functional  forms. Thus, the linearity  assumption  should  not affect the simulation  results
in the case  of small  changes, such as the effect of a PTA in the case of an infinitesimal  reduction
in the tariff rate on the partner's imports, though it may limit the generality  of the results in the
case of large changes, such as a FTA where the tariff on the partner is set to zero.
The demand  for imports by the home country is
(3) D = a - bP,  a > 0, b >  0.
The excess-supply  curve of country i is
(4) Si = c; + d1P 1,  di >  0,  c; <  0;  i  =  1, 2.
The intercept  on the horizontal  axis c 1 is assumed  to be negative  because Si is an excess-
supply  function  and I assume  that at price zero, demand is larger than supply so that the partner
country and the ROW would  be net importers (At Pi = 0, Si =  c;  <  0).
Prices P, P 1 and P2 are given by
(5)  P =  [d1T, +  d2T2 + a - (cl +  c2 MI/(d 1 + d2 + b),
(6) Pi =  [djTj  - (dj + b)Ti + a - (cl + c 2)I/(d,  + d2 + b);  i =  1, 2; j  = 3 -i.
15Quantities Q, SI and S2  are given by
(7) Q =  [a(d, + d2)  + b(c,  + c2) - b(d 1T 1 +  d2T2)]/(d, + d 2 + b),
(8) Si =  [ci(dj +  b) +  di(a - cj) +  d 1d2Tj - d 1(dj +  b)TJ/(d 1 +  d,  + b); i =  1, 2; j  =  3-i.
Welfare W is
(9) W =  (a/b - P).Q/2  + TIS,  + T2S2,
=  Q2/2b  +  TIS,  +  T2S2,
where a/b is the value of P when D =  0.  The solution for W is
(10) W =  (1/2b).{[a(d,  +  d2)  +  b(c,  +  c2) - b(d 1Tj  +  d2T2)]/(d,  +  d2 +  b)}2
+  {[c,(d 2 +  b)  + d,(a - c2)].Tj  +  [c2(d 1 +  b) +  d2(a - c1)].T2 +  2d,d2T,T 2
- dl(d 2 +  b).Tj 2 - d2(d 1 +  b).T 2
2}/(d 1 +  d2 +  b),
where the first term (i.e., the first line) is the consumer surplus and the second term (i.e.,
the second and third lines) is the tariff revenue.
The home country forms a PTA by reducing its tariff T, on imports from country 1, the
partner  country.  A PTA does not necessarily imply that T, is set to zero, but only that it be
16reduced to a level below the tariff T,  imposed on  imports from the ROW. 9 The impact of a
change in T, on home country welfare W is given below for the more general case where T, and
T, can take any value.  That impact is
(11)  MW/UT 1 =  -dl.Q/(d,  +  d,  +  b)
+  [cl(d,  +  b)  +  d,(a  - c )  +  2d,d,T,  - 2dj(d2 +  b)T,]/(d,  +  d,  +  b).
The first termn  is the effect of an increase in T, on the consumer surplus (a/b - P).Q/2 and
is negative.  Thus, forming a PTA (i.e..  a decrease in T,) results in an increase in the consumer
surplus.  Note that the increase in consumer surplus tends to zero as d 2 tends to infinity, i.e.,  as
the ROW's  supply curve becomes infinitely elastic.  The reason is that a change in T, has no
impact on the domestic price P in that case (see equation (5) and Section II).
The second term is the effect of an increase in T, on tariff revenue TIS, +  T2S2. Its sign
is ambiguous and depends on all parameter values and on initial tariff levels.  Thus, the sign of
aWM5T, is ambiguous a priori.  This is no surprise since we know since Viner (1950) that the
formation  of a PTA entails a situation of second best,  with trade creation and trade diversion
effects.  Substituting for Q from equation (7), equation (11 ) can be rewritten as
(11) 8W/8T,  =  {adjb +  c,b2 +  c1d, 2 c2dl2 +  d,d 2(c,  - c2)  +  2b(c 1d2 - c2dl) +
d,d,T,(2d,  +  2d,  +  3b) - 2d 1Tl[dld,  +  (d,  +  b)21}/(di  +  d2 +  b) 2.
9Note that the formation of a PTA rather than a FTA is GATT-consistent in the case of
developing countries.
17Note  that one can solve for the optimum tariffs T,  and T, 2 . These can be derived by
solving for 6W/6T 2 and by setting 8W/6Tj  =  WMT2 =  0.  We have two (linear) equations in
T, and T2,  and we can solve for the optimal values T,  and T,'.
As  noted  above,  the welfare  impact  6W/6T,  has  two comilponlents. These  ale  the  impact
on the consumer surplus 6Wcs/6Tj and the impact on revenue 6W R/6T  , with aW hs/T,  +
8WR/ 6Tj  =  6W/8T 1 . The impact on the consumer surplus 6W,,/6T1 is giveni by
(12) 6Wcs/6T,  =  - d,.Q/(d,  +  d2 +b)
- d,.[a(d,  +  d,)  +  b(c,  +  c.)  - b(d1Tj  +  d T,)]/(d,  +  d2 +b)-  <  0.
2. Market Size. Market Share. Efficiency and Trade Policy
The welfare impact 6W/oT, measures the impact of an increase in T,.  A PTA implies a
reduction in the tariff T,.  Thus, define X - - 6W/6T 1,  where X measures the welfar-e  impact of
a  small  reduction  in the tariff  on the partner  country's  imiports.  Similarly,  detine  X(S  -s
aWcs/6TI and XR  - aWR/6Tj, with  X =  XCS +  XR.
A. Higher Demand for Imports
Is a PTA more beneficial when homiie  country demand for imipor-ts  is small or wlhen1  it is
large?  A higher level of import demand may be due to a larger population, to a higher per capita
income (and imports being a normal good), or to a reduction in production efficiency in the home
country.  Of  course,  if  imiports increase,  exports  must Increase  as  well,  and  if the  increase  il
exports is partly to the partner country, then the improved mar-ket  access associated with the PTA
18will generate a larger welfare gain.  But what about the import side?
The shift in demand is modeled by an increase in the intercept "a" of the import demand
function.  The effect of an increase in "a" is
(13) 8X/Ia =  - dlb/(d,  +  d2  +  b)2 <  0.
Equation  (13) says that the welfare impact of a PTA falls as the demand for imports
increases.  The reason is that as total import demand rises, the amount S, imported from the
partner  country rises as well.  And since S 1 is the tax base on which the tariff is being reduced
under the formation of the PTA, the increase in S, results in a larger loss in tariff revenue.  Note
that  what  matters  is the effect on the level of S, after the PTA is formed.  With larger total
imports,  S, is larger both before and after the PTA is formed since the slope d I  of St  is
unchanged. This negative effect on revenue dominates the positive effect which a larger level of
imports has on Xcs
Equation (13) also implies that 6XI6a is independent of the level of T,.  Integrating 8X/ba
over values of T,  between T,'s  initial value and T,  =  0, we obtain the effect of an increase in
import demand on the welfare impact of a FTA.  That effect is equal to - T1.[d,b/(d 1 +  d2  + b)2]
<  0.  Thus, the welfare impact of a FTA falls as the demand for imports increases.
Equation (13) shows that the result 8X/Ia  <  0 holds irrespective of whether the increase
in imports originates mostly in the partner country or mostly in the ROW.  This can be seen from
equations (7), (8) and (13).  Total imports increase by (d 1 + d2)/(d, +  d2 + b),  imports from the
partner increase by di/(d 1 +  d2  + b), and imports from the ROW increase by d2/(d 1 +  d2 +  b).
19The relative increase in imports depends on d,/d2. As can be seen from equation (13), the result
8X/ba  <  0 holds for any value of d,/d2 (assuming d,  >  0 and d,,  d 2 <  -)
However, the fall in the welfare impact X of the PTA (due to the increase in total import
demand)  is larger,  the larger the share of the increase in total imports which originates in the
partner country because when the share dj/(d,  + d2) is larger, so is the increase in the base S, on
which the tariff T,  is reduced.'0 Thus, for a given di,  the reduction  in X due to an increase in
import demand decreases as the slope d2 of the ROW's supply curve increases.  From equation
(13), 8(6X/6a)/6d2 =  2d,b/(d 1 + d2 + b) 3 >  0.  And 8X/6a tends to zero as d2 tends to infinity.
Thus, if the ROW's supply curve is infinitely elastic, an increase in import demand has no effect
on the price and thus has no effect on imports from the partner (and the ROW supplies the entire
increase in import demand).  In that case, the welfare impact of a PTA remains unchanged when
import demand increases.
In general,  a PTA is more beneficial (or less harmful) for a country with lower import
demand.  A PTA is also more beneficial for a country with a more efficient import-substituting
sector, as this will result in a lower demand for imports.
Finally,  assume that transport costs to the partner country and to the ROW decrease in
equal amounts.  This can be modeled by an increase in import demand, where the demand price
is net of transport costs.  As seen from equation (13), the reduction in transport costs will have
'IThis result can be derived from equation (13) by taking the derivative of 8X/6a with respect
to dj/d2 or with respect to d,/(d1 + d2).  Both derivatives are negative.
20a negative effect on the welfare impact of a PTA because lower transport costs will result in larger
imports from the partner country.
B. Increase in the Efficiency of the Partner (ROW)
A gain in the partner's efficiency will result in lower production costs and in an outward
shift  of  the partner's  supply  curve  SI.  Assume  that  the  reduction  in  the  marginal cost  is
independent of output, i.e., that the marginal cost falls by a constant.  This can be represented by
an increase in cl.  The shift in cl may also be due to an export subsidy or to a reduction in unit
transport costs on imports from the partner country.  The effect of an increase in cl on X is
(14) 6X/6c, =  -(b 2 +  d2
2 +  dId2 +  2bd 2)/(d,  +  d,  +  b)2 <  0.
Thus, an increase in partner efficiency associated with an increase in cl results in a smaller
value of X, i.e.,  in a smaller welfare impact of a PTA on the home country.
The effect  of an increase  in cl on the welfare impact of a FTA is also negative.  It is
obtained by integrating oX/oc,  over values of T, between T, 's initial value and '  =  0.  That
effect is equal to -T,.[(b2 +  d 2
2 +  d 1d 2 +  2bd2)/(d,  + d2 +  b) 2]  <  0.
This  is a somewhat surprising  result since the conventional wisdom is that a regional
agreement with a more efficient partner should be more beneficial for the home country since it
would be expected to generate more trade creation and less trade diversion.  The result here is due
to the effect on the tax base.  An increase in cl results in a higher tax base SI (equation (8)) on
which the tariff T, is reduced under the PTA.  This negative effect on XR dominates the positive
21effect of an increase in c, on XCs
The effect on X of increased efficiency in the ROW caused by an increase in c, is
(15) 6X/6c 2 =  d,(d,  +  d 2 +  2b)/(d,  +  d,  +  b)2 >  0.
Thus, an increase in efficiency in the ROW due to an outward shift in S, raises the welfare
impact of a PTA with the (partner) country whose relative efficiency has fallen.  Again, this is
due to the effect on the tax base SI which falls as c2 increases (equation (8)).  An outward shift
in S2 also raises the welfare impact of a FTA.  That effect is equal to Tl.[dl(d,  +  d,  + 2b)/(d,  +
d2 +  b)2]  >  0.
Assume the U.S. and the EU are identical.  El Salvador and Mexico face higher transport
costs  in their trade with the EU, and Morocco and Tunisia face higher transport costs in their
trade with the U.S.  Thus, El Salvador and Mexico (Morocco and Tunisia) trade more with the
U.S.  (EU).1'  Then,  from  the viewpoint of exports,  El Salvador and Mexico  (Morocco and
Tunisia) are better off forming a PTA with the U.S.  (EU).  However,  the opposite is true from
the viewpoint of imports: El Salvador and Mexico (Morocco and Tunisia) are better off forming
a PTA with the EU (U.S.).
The choice of partners depends on which of the two effects dominates, the one related to
the import side or the one related to the export side.  If the effect on the import side dominates
"I  assume  an internal solution, i.e.,  I assume that the U.S.  and the EU supply curves of
exports  to Mexico and to Morocco are not both  infinitely elastic.  If they were,  then Mexico
would import only from the U.S. and Morocco would import only from the EU.
22(either because the initial barriers imposed by the U.S.  and the EU are already low, or because
the PTA will not lead to a significant reduction in trade barriers), then El Salvador and Mexico
(Morocco  and Tunisia) would be better off forming a PTA with the EU (U.S.).  Effects on the
import side may in fact dominate since U.S. trade barriers are already low, and because Morocco
and Tunisia did not obtain much in terms of increased access for its exports in its agreement with
the EU. 
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C. Increase in the Share Imported from the Partner (ROW)
Assume cl increases.  In order to isolate the effect of changes in regional shares imported
from the effect of changes in the total level of imports, shares must be changed in such a way as
to  keep total initial imports Q constant.  This can be obtained by reducing either  the ROW's
supply shifter c2 or the import demand shifter "a".  The reduction in  c 2  can be caused by a
reduction in efficiency in the ROW, while the reduction in "a" can be caused either by a reduction
in income or by an increase in efficiency of production in the home country.
Starting with c2, in order to keep initial imports constant, c2 has to be reduced by the same
amount as c, is increased (see equation(7)).  Thus,  in this case, the effect on X of an increase in
the share  imported from  the partner  is obtained by subtracting 8X/6c2 in equation  (15) from
oX/oc,  in equation (14).  The result is
12Obviously, other factors may play a decisive role in determining who to integrate with.  For
instance, Morocco has obtained larger transfers from the EU following the signing of the FTA.
In the case of Mexico, it expected to raise the credibility of its policy reforms and it may have
obtained additional help from the U.S. during the December 1994 crisis as a member of NAFTA
than would have occurred otherwise.
23(16) 6X/6c 1 - 6X/bc,  - 1.
Thus, the welfare impact of a PTA falls as the share imported from the partner increases.
That the effect on the welfare impact is exactly equal to - 1 can be explained as follows.  A PTA
is implemented here by a one unit reduction in T,.  The only effect of an outward shift of SI by
one unit accompanied by an inward shift of S, by one unit is to lose one additional unit of tariff
revenue when the PTA is formed.  All that has occurred  is that the base SI, on which the tariff
is being reduced,  is one unit larger.  The impact of the PTA on the consumer surplus is not
affected in this case.
The effect of an increase in the share imported from the partner on the welfare impact
of a FTA is -T,  <  0 (which is obtained by integrating 6X/8c, - 6X/6c 2 =  - 1 over values of T,
between T,'s  initial value and T,  =  0).  Thus, the welfare impact of a FTA also falls as the share
imported from the partner increases.
Total initial imports can also be kept constant when cl increases by reducing the demand
shifter "a".  From equation (7), the change in "a" required to keep Q constant is ba/6cl  =  -b/(dj
+  d,).  From equations (13) and (14), 8X/6c, - [b/(d, +  d2)].6X/6a  =  [b2d, - (d 1 +  d2)(b 2 +  d2
2
+  dld 2 + 2bd 2)]/(d1 + d, + b)2(dI +  d)  <  0.  Thus, in this case as well, an increase in the share
imported  from the partner  reduces the welfare impact of a PTA.  And it reduces the welfare
impact of a FTA as well.
D. Changes in Initial Level of Protection
I now examine how the welfare irnpact of a PTA is affected by a change in the initial value
24of T,,  T2 or both.  The effect of a change in T, is
(17) 8X/6T, =  2d,[dld2 +  (d 2 +  b)2]/(d,  +  d2 +  b)2 >  0.
Equation (17) says that, independently of the level of tariff T2 on the ROW, the higher the
initial import tariff T, on the partner's  imports, the larger the welfare impact of a small reduction
in Tl.  The reason is as follows.  The larger the tariff T ,  the smaller the imports ,S from the
partner country (see equation (8)).  And since S, is the tax base on which the tariff T, is reduced
under the PTA, the smaller that tax base, the smaller the loss from tariff reduction.  Even though
bXcs/8Tl <  0 (obtained from equation (12)), the positive effect 6XR/8Tj  dominates the negative
effect bXcs/6T,.  13
Equation (17) does not imply that a complete elimination of the tariff T, with the partner
country - i.e. a free trade agreement (FTA) - is more beneficial (or less harmful) when the initial
tariff T, is higher.  The reason is that even though 8X/6T,  >  0, X - the welfare impact of the
PTA - may itself be negative.  If X  >  0 at the initial level of T, and T2, then a slightly higher
initial value of T,  will result in a larger welfare impact of a FTA.  However,  if X  <  0 at the
initial level of T, and T2, then a slightly higher initial value of T, will result in a smaller welfare
impact of a FTA.1 4
'3The reason 6Xcs/ITj is negative is that a higher T, results in lower imports Q (see equation
(7)).  A small reduction  in T,  results  in a  lower price  P.  And the resulting increase  in the
consumer surplus is smaller when the price reduction applies to a smaller base Q.
"Note that if at some point along the reduction in T,, imports from the ROW fall to zero, then
any further reduction in T, is equivalent to unilateral trade liberalization and is beneficial.  In this
25The fact that 8X/6T,  >  0 implies that the welfare impact X of a marginal reduction in T,
keeps falling as T, falls.  Consequently, if X <  0 at the initial level of T, and T2, then X <  0 at
lower  levels  of T,,  and a FTA must  necessarily lower welfare (since the sum or  integral of
increasingly negative values of X is negative).  On the other hand, if X >  0 at the initial level of
T,,  and since X falls as T,  falls, X may reach zero at a positive tariff T,° >  0 (with X <  0 for
T,  <  T1a).  In that case, given T2, T,0 is the optimum tariff, and the impact of a FTA on welfare
is ambiguous.
The effect of a change in T2 is
(18) 8X/6T 2 =  -dld 2(2d, +  2d 2 +  3b)/(d,  + d2 +  b) 2 <  0.
Equation (18) says that, for a given tariff T, on the partner country's  imports, the higher
the initial import tariff on the ROW, the smaller the welfare impact of a small reduction in the
tariff T,.  The reason is that the tax base, S , increases with T  (see equation (8)).  Moreover,
5Xcs/6T 2 <  0 as well.  By integrating 8X/1T2 over all values of T, between T 's initial value and
T,  =  0, we find that a higher T2 lowers the welfare impact of a FTA, with the effect equal to -
T,.[d,d2(2d,  +  2d2 + 3b)/(d,  +  d 2 +  b) 2]  <  0.  In fact, by lowering the tariff on the ROW
sufficiently,  it is possible to turn welfare-reducing PTAs into welfare-improving PTAs for the
home country,  and similarly for FTAs.  This point has been made by Leipziger  and Winters
(1995) and by Schiff (1995) who argue that a FTA between Chile and NAFTA would generate
paper,  I assume that the home country continues to import from the ROW after it establishes a
FTA with the partner country.
26larger gains for Chile if it simultaneously lowered its tariff rate on the ROW from its present level
of 11 percent.
IV. Additional Issues
A. Rules of Origin
One important issue regarding FTAs are rules of origin.  Assume, as in Section II, a FTA
between two small countries who take the world price as given.  Starting from an MFN tariff T,
we found that the home country lost from forming a FTA because of a loss in tariff revenue on
imports from the partner country equal to EFGI (see Figure 1).  However, if the tariff Tp imposed
by the partner on the ROW is lower than T, then if the partner country can sell imports from the
ROW in the home country market, the home country loses control of its trade policy vis-a-vis the
ROW and its effective tariff with respect to the ROW becomes the lower tariff Tp of the partner
country.  The result is the same as that of a unilateral reduction in the home country tariff from
T to Tp,  but with one important difference: the tariff revenues are collected by the partner country
rather than by the home country.  To prevent such trade 'deflection'  and limit the imports from
the partner  country to those goods actually produced in the partner country, rules of origin are
generally established as part of FTAs.
Assume that trade deflection is in fact efficiently dealt with.  An additional problem is that
the partner country may sell not just its excess supply Q2 (see Figure 1) to the home country, but
may decide  to sell its entire output (or a large part of it; see below) to the home country and
obtain its consumption from the ROW (see Bhagwati and Panagariya  1995).  In that case, the
partner country will sell more than Q2 to the home country, and rules of origin are not necessarily
27effective even though no trade deflection takes place.
What is the impact of a FTA on welfare in this case?  There are three possible outcomes.
First, if the output of the partner country is less than Q3 at price Pw + T (see Figure  1), so that
the home country still imports from the ROW, then the home country welfare loss from the FTA
is larger than area EFGI because of the increased imports from the partner country on which no
tariff is paid.  Second, if output from the partner  is larger than Q3 at price Pw +  T, the home
country will no longer import from the ROW, and the price will fall below Pw +  T (though not
below Pw + Tp, the replacement cost in the partner country).  In that case, it is unclear whether
the welfare loss from the FTA is larger or smaller than area EFGI (see Figure  1).  The reason is
that the tariff revenues on imports from the ROW are lost but efficiency gains are obtained from
the lower price.  Third, if output from the partner at price Pw + T.  is larger than the demand in
the home country at that price, then the price will be Pw + T.,  the partner country will sell only
part of its output to the home country, and it is again unclear whether the welfare loss is larger
or smaller than area EFGI.
Thus, if the home country continues to import from the ROW after forming the FTA, the
home country will lose from forming the FTA and the loss will be larger than area EFGI.  On the
other hand, if the home country stops importing from the ROW after forming the FTA, the loss
may be larger or smaller than EFGI.  In fact, the home country may even gain if T. is sufficiently
small.  The reason is that with partner output at price Pw +  Tp larger than home country demand
at that price,  the effect of forming a FTA is close to that of unilateral liberalization.
28B.  Smuggling
Assume,  as in Section  II, a FTA between  two small countries  who take the world price as
given.  The analysis in Section  II and in Section  IV.B is based on the assumption  that the tariff
is actually  paid on imports  from the partner country  under the MFN tariff. However, smuggling
accounts  for an important  share of trade in a number  of developing  countries. If under the MFN
tariff all home country  imports  from the partner  country  are smuggled  into the home country, no
tariff revenues  are obtained  by the home country on these imports, and thus none are lost under
the FTA.  The partner country may not only smuggle its own output into the home country but
may also buy imports from the ROW in order to smuggle them into the home country.  No
smuggling  will take place if the partner country applies a tariff Tp on imports from the ROW
larger or equal to the home country tariff T. 15
Assume  that the tariff T. applied  by the partner  country  on imports  from the ROW is lower
than  T.  Then, before the FTA is formed, individuals  in the partner country  will pay P,  + Tp  for
imports  from the ROW  which they  will smuggle  and sell in the home country. What is the impact
of forming a FTA on welfare in this case?  I examine four possible  cases: smuggling  is either
costly or costless, and rules of origin are either enforced  or not enforced.
I) First, assume  that smuggling  is costless.  In that case, there will be no direct imports by
the home country from the ROW, the home country collects no tariff revenue at all, and the
'5If  the price in the partner  country in autarky  is between  Pw  and Pw + T, the partner will not
trade with the ROW.  However, since its autarky price is lower than the price in the home
country, it would probably be profitable  to smuggle  some of its output into the home country.
However, in the case of small neighboring  developing  countries, it is likely that they will have
similar  factor endowments  and that they will be net importers  of the same  goods from the ROW.
29domestic home country price is P,  + Tp.
a) Assume that rules of origin are not enforced.  Then, the FTA has no impact.
b) Alternatively, assume that rules of origin are fully enforced (say, because formation of
the FTA leads to cooperation on enforcing trade rules among the members of the FTA).  Then,
the partner country can sell some or all of its own output to the home country.  If output from the
partner at price Pw + Tp is larger than the import demand in the home country at that price, then
the price will be Pw +  Tp as before the formation of the FTA, and the FTA has no impact on
welfare.  If output from the partner is not sufficient to satisfy home country import demand at
price Pw +  Tp, then the home country price will be higher than P w + T p but not higher than
Pw+T.  If the price is below Pw +  T, the home country continues not to import from the ROW
and the higher price implies a loss for the home country (and a gain for the partner country).  If
output from the partner country at Pw +  T is less than Q3 - the home country import demand at
that  price  (see Figure  1) - then the home country will import from  the ROW the difference
between its import demand (Q3)  and the partner country's  supply at price Pw +  T.  Then, the
impact of the FTA on home country welfare is ambiguous because the home country loses from
the higher price but gains from the tariff revenue collected on imports from the ROW.
II) Smuggling may entail real resource costs.  Assume that there is an upward-sloping
supply of smuggling services.  Since the partner country's importers buy from the ROW at Pw +
Tp, the marginal cost of smuggling cannot be higher than T  -,T  in equilibrium (since home
country importers can always buy from the ROW at Pw +  T).  Consider two alternatives: a) the
marginal cost of smuggling at Q 3 (see Figure  1) is higher than T - Tp, or b) it is lower than T -
TP.
30a) Assume that the marginal cost of smuggling at Q 3 is higher than T - Tp . Then, the
amount smuggled from the partner will be lower than Q 3 and the rest will be imported from the
ROW,  with the price  in the home country equal to Pw +  T.  Once the FTA  is formed, and
assuming rules of origin are fully enforced, smuggling no longer takes place.
If the total output of the partner is less than Q3 at price Pw + T,  then the home country
will continue to import from the ROW.  The price remains Pw +  T.  The impact of the FTA on
home country welfare depends on the effect of the FTA on the volume of imports from the ROW.
If  the amount smuggled from the partner  country before the formation of the FTA  is larger
(smaller) than the amount imported from the partner country after formation of the FTA, imports
from  the ROW increase (fall) and the FTA results in an increase (fall) in welfare (since tariff
revenues are collected on imports from the ROW).
If total output of the partner is larger than Q3 at price Pw + T, then the price in the home
country falls below Pw + T after formation of the FTA and the home country no longer imports
from the ROW.  The impact of the FTA on home country welfare is ambiguous because revenues
on imports from the ROW vanish (a welfare loss), while the fall in price results in a welfare gain.
b) Alternatively,  assume that smuggling is costly but that the cost of smuggling at Q3 is
less than T - Tp.  Then, all imports are from the partner before formation of the FTA.  The price
is lower than Pw +  T,  the home country does not  import from  the ROW and it collects no
revenue.  The impact of the FTA on home country welfare is ambiguous in this case as well.  If
partner country supply is so large that the price in the home country falls, the home country gains.
If partner country supply is smaller and the home country price rises but remains lower than Pw
+ T, the home country loses.  And if partner country supply is less than Q3 at price P^, + T,  so
31that the price  rises  to Pw +  T  and the difference between Q  and partner  country supply is
imported  from the ROW,  then the impact of the FTA on home country welfare is ambiguous
because the higher price results in a welfare loss but the revenues collected on imports from the
ROW are a welfare gain.
Thus,  if smuggling is costless,  a FTA will have no impact on home country welfare if
rules of origin are not enforced and will either  have no impact on home country welfare, will
result in a loss, or will have an ambiguous impact, if rules of origin are enforced.  If smuggling
is costly and rules of origin are enforced,  the impact of the FTA on home country welfare is
ambiguous.  It can be shown that the impact on welfare is ambiguous as well if smuggling is
costly and rules of origin are not enforced.
V. Conclusion
The analysis presented here has shown that
a) as far as the import side is concerned,  "small is beautiful": the impact of a PTA on
home  country  welfare is larger the smaller the volume of imports from  the partner  and the
smaller the share of imports from the partner.  This result is due to the fact that the smaller the
imports from the partner, the smaller the loss in tariff revenue associated with a PTA.  This effect
dominates the negative effect (of smaller imports from the partner) on the impact of the PTA on
the consumer surplus.  These results hold irrespective of whether the member countries are small
or large on the world market;
b) a PTA between small countries  with exogenously given terms of trade results  in a
welfare loss for the PTA members as a whole;
32c) once the FTA is formed, and even if rules of origin are fully enforced, if the partner
country's  MFN tariff is lower than that of the home country, the partner may sell all or part of
its output to the home country.  Then, the FTA
i) results in a larger welfare loss if the home country still imports from the ROW, or
ii) has an ambiguous effect on home country welfare if the home country no longer imports from
the ROW;
d) in the case of smuggling, and if the partner country's  MFN tariff is lower than that of
the home country, then
i) if smuggling is costless and rules of origin are not enforced, the home country price remains
equal to that in the partner country and the FTA has no impact on home country welfare,
ii) if smuggling is costless and rules of origin are enforced,  then if partner country output  is so
large that the home country price remains equal to that in the partner country, the FTA has no
impact on home country welfare; if partner country output is smaller and the home country price
rises but remains lower than the MFN-tariff inclusive price on imports from the ROW (with zero
home country imports from the ROW), the FTA results in a welfare loss for the home country;
and if partner country output is smaller still and the home country imports from the ROW, then
the impact of the FTA on home country is ambiguous; and
iii) if smuggling is costly, the impact of a FTA is ambiguous, whether rules of origin are enforced
or not.
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